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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IMPORTS-Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S.Ct. 535, 46
L.Ed. 2d 495 (1976)
Are tires imported into the United States subject to state ad
valorem property taxation while they are being held in inventory at the
wholesale distributor's warehouse? Michelin, which manufactured the
tires in France and Nova Scotia, held them for resale to its franchised
dealers in a Gwinnett County, Georgia warehouse. The tires had been
shipped in bulk and were not removed from any packaging before they
were stored.
A lower court enjoined the Tax Commissioner from levying a
property tax on the tires. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed,
holding that because the tires were commingled with existing inventory, they lost their status as imports and could be taxed without
violating the U. S. Constitution's prohibition against state taxation of
imports (Art. I, §10, Cl. 2). The United States Supreme Court upheld
the decision unanimously, but on the different ground that Georgia's
assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax was not
contrary to the Constitutional prohibition. The Supreme Court did not
address the question of whether the Georgia high court was correct in
holding that the tires had lost their status as imports.
Justice Brennan's opinion stated that the framers of the Constitution intended the import-export clause to insure a free flow of goods by
prohibiting seaboard states from levying import taxes which would
indirectly curtail the transit of products to inland states. To this end,
the Constitution vests the federal government with exclusive power to
regulate foreign commerce and to receive the revenues from all
imposts and duties on imports.
An ad valorem property tax levied on imported property located in
the state does not defeat the purpose behind the import-export clause
unless the tax is designed to discriminate between imported and
domestic goods, and thereby create a discriminatory preference for
domestic goods.
A non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax is not a tax on
imports. Instead, it is a tax on the existence of property in the state.
Both imported and domestic goods benefit from the same statesupplied services, such as fire and police protection. An ad valorem tax
is the means by which the state apportions the costs of its services
among the beneficiaries of those services according to their respective
wealth. An importer should bear his share of the cost of the services
which he receives from the state.
An ad valorem tax does not interfere with commercial intercourse
among the states because modern methods of transportation make it
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very easy for importers to avoid the imposition of such a tax by
shipping from abroad directly into the state where the goods are to be
sold. Furthermore, a property tax imposed on warehoused goods
should be reflected in the cost of those goods to the ultimate consumer.
The petitioner argued that the tires were still in transit as part of a
"continuous flow of commerce from manufacturer to ultimate consumer." But the Court found that the import transit ceased when the
goods were inventoried at the wholesale distribution center.
The opinion expressly overruled part of Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 29 (1871): Low v. Austin specifically held that imports not
removed from their original shipping containers were exempt from ad
valorem taxation. Justice Brennan indicated unequivocally that the
Court now finds the words "imposts or duties" in the import-export
clause to be ambiguous and that only the clearest Constitutional
mandate-should lead to a condemnation of state ad valorem property
taxation when that taxation does not create the evils the import-export
clause was specifically intended to elimiate.
JURISDICTION-TreasureSalvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408
F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976)
Treasure Salvors, Inc. brought suit for possession of and confirmation of title to a vessel which it had discovered on the continental shelf
outside of the United States' territorial waters. The United States
answered and counterclaimed, contending that the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1343, which asserts jurisdiction
over the seabed and subsoil of the outer continental shelf, operated to
bring the vessel within its jurisdiction. The United States further
contended that under other federal legislation it could claim title to the
vessel as either an item of antiquity or as abandoned property on
United States lands.
In denying the government's claim, the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida stated that the Act merely asserted
jurisdiction over minerals in and under the outer continental shelf. The
court further stated that to the extent the Act sought to assert
jurisdiction over sunken treasures, its jurisdictional effect was nullified
by the United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf. September 15, 1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act declares as policy of the
United States that the seabed and subsoil of the outer continental shelf
are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition. This
extension of power is limited to the seabed and subsoil by a provision
of the Act that preserves the character of the waters above the outer
continental shelf as high seas, not to be affected by the Act.
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The extension of jurisdiction allowed under the Convention is
similar to that asserted by the Act, in that the Convention permits the
coastal states to exercise sovereign powers over the seabed and subsoil
of the outer continental shelf for the purposes of exploration and
exploitation of its natural resources. The Convention provides that the
status of the waters above the outer continental shelf as high seas is not
to be affected by the rights of the coastal states.
The court's rejection of the government's claim was based on the
International Law Commission's Comment 5 to Article 68 of the
Convention. That Comment provides that rights in wrecked ships and
their cargoes lying on the seabed or covered by the sands of the subsoil
are not included in the sovereign powers granted to the coastal states.
As an alternative ground for its holding, the court found that the
Act limited the assertion of jurisdiction by the United States to
minerals in and under the outer continental shelf. This interpretation
limits the extension of jurisdiction more severely than is required by
either the Act or the Convention. The Conference Report accompanying the Act indicates that the extension of jurisdiction was intended to
encompass more than natural resources. The term "natural resources"
has been defined by prior related legislation to include animal and
plant life as well as minerals. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301(e). The Convention
similarly allows the coastal states to assert sovereign powers not only
over minerals, but also over other non-living resources and living
organisms belonging to the sedentary species-.
The court could have achieved the same result without limiting the
extention of jurisdiction to minerals. While courts of the United States
have stated that the primary purpose of the Act was to assert
jurisdiction over minerals, Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1970),
they have not limited its jurisdictional effect solely to minerals, United
States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
Since the limitation imposed by the court in Treasure Salvors, Inc.
was not required for its holding, a subsequent decision could hold that
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act extends to more than minerals,
and that it includes the broader assertion of jurisdiction and control
allowed by the Convention of the Continental Shelf. Such a holding
would not necessarily overrule the result of TreasureSalvors, Inc. which
is supportable on its facts by reliance on the Comment of the International Law Commission which expressly excludes wrecked ships and
their cargoes from the exercise of sovereign power.
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ENERGY IMPORTS-Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2295 (1976).
On January 23, 1975, President Ford invoked section 232(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 19621 in a proclamation aimed at reducing the
dependence of the United States on imported petroleum and petroleum products. 2 The President accelerated the existing license fees
and imposed supplemental fees of up to $3 per barrel on these imports.
Four days later, eight northeastern states and their governors, ten
utility companies, and one member of Congress filed suit alleging that
the President's imposition of license fees had exceeded constitutional
and statutory authority. The district court upheld the presidential
action. 3 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed, holding that the President may adjust imports only through
direct methods and that the license fees were indirect methods beyond
the scope of the Act. 4 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, 5 finding no unconstitutional delegation of power. The
Court further held that the language and legislative history of section
232(b) indicate a congressional intent to authorize the use of license
fees.
In considering the constitutional challenge to the President's
action, Justice Marshall dismissed the court of appeals' concern that
such an action "would represent an anomalous delegation of almost
unbridled discretion and authority in the tariff area." The Court stated
that a delegation of legislative power is not unconstitutional where
Congress provides an intelligible principle to which an exercise of the
power must conform. This requirement was found to be satisfied in the
authorization of section 232(b) that the President may act only to the
extent necessary to eliminate a threat to the national security, and in
the standards provided by section 232(c) to guide the President's initial
decision to act.
Devoting most of the opinion to an attempt to ascertain the intent
of Congress, the Court found no basis for a distinction limiting the
119 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1970), as amended, Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit.

I, ch. 2, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993. Section 232(b) provides in relevant part:
If the Secretary [of the Treasury] finds that [an] article is being imported into
the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President and the
President shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will
not threaten to impair the national security, unless the President determines
that the article is not being imported into the United States in such quantities
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.
2
pres. Proc. No. 4341, 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 (1975).
3
Massachusetts v. Simon, Civil No. 75-0129 (D.D.C. 1975), reprinted at 518 F.2d
1064.
4
Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. FEA, 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2295 (1976).
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President's authorization to "direct" methods such as quotas and
excluding "indirect" methods such as license fees. The Court refused
to assume that quotas would be a feasible means of dealing with
national security threats in all circumstances and reasoned that limiting
the President to "direct" methods would artifically prevent him from
dealing with the variety of problems anticipated by the broad language
of the statute. In rejecting the court of appeals' reading of the
legislative history, the Court noted that Congress had reenacted
section 232(b) without material change following President Nixon's
introduction of the. license fee system in 1973. This reenactment was
found to be an acquiescence in the presidential action which, considered together with earlier statements by members of Congress and
the rejection of certain proposed amendments, confirmed the view that
Congress intended to authorize license fees as a means of adjusting
imports.

EXPORTS - Export Administration Amendments of 1976, S.3084,
H.R. 15377, 94th Congress, 2d. Sess. (1976); Exec. Order No.
11940; compiled in part from the International Report of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Vol. 4, No. 9 and
a Special Report of the Bureau of National Affairs.
Legislation was introduced in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate during the past 94th Congress which would have
extended the Export Administration Act of 1969. The 1969 Act was the
basic statute conferring broad authority on the Executive Branch to
regulate United States exports of materials, supplies, and technical
data to communist countries when matters of national security, foreign
policy, and domestic short supply were involved. The House and
Senate failed to extend the export control program before Congress
adjourned October 2, 1976. The 1969 Act had already expired according
to its own provisions on September 30, 1976. On this same date,
however, President Ford had issued an Executive Order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to continue administering the export control
program under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917. So, although Congress failed to extend the Export Administra-
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tion Act of 1969, the presidential order has basically enabled the Act to
continue in effect with few changes. 1
The House and Senate bills, although not enacted, are significant
because they both indicate a changed policy in the regulation of United
States exports. The bills also indicate a strong disapproval by the
United States of foreign boycotts. Furthermore, President Ford's
Executive Order of September 30, 1976 and a subsequent issuance of
new export regulations have raised some statutory and procedural
questions. This Recent Developments article will briefly review these
trends in Congressional thinking and suggest the basis for these
potential statutory and procedural problems.
Under present law, a United States company seeking to export
goods or technical data to a communist country is required to file an
application for an export license with the Department of Commerce.
This department seeks the advice of other executive agencies before
making a decision to grant the license. Where the export license might
have a significant impact on foreign policy or domestic short supply,
the applications must be reviewed by the Departments of State and
Agriculture. The Secretary of Defense is required to review all applications to determine if the exports would significantly increase the
military capability of the recipient country. Upon these recommendations, the Secretary of Commerce grants or denies an export license.
Any action taken by the Secretary of Commerce must be consistent
with any decision which the President has made concerning restricted
export items. It is through this licensing mechanism that the government's export restrictions are implemented and controlled.
The determinative factor in regulating United States exports under
the 1969 Act was the communist or non-communist status of a country.
All exports to communist countries were more restrictively controlled
than those to non-communist countries. Two major complaints were
made about this approach. One, it allowed anachronistic "cold war
perceptions of national security to dominate the export control pro' The only difference in the 1969 Act and the present emergency regulations are
found in the penalty provisions and the provisions for the disclosure of boycott
reports. The 1969 Act provided for civil fines up to $1,000 and a penalty for willful
violations of five times the value of the exports involved or $20,000, whichever was
greater, or five years imprisonment, or both. The Trading with the Enemy Act,
however, authorizes no civil fines and the penalty for willful violations is limited to
$10,000, or ten years imprisonment, or both. The penalties under the emergency
regulations were changed to conform with the limitations imposed by the Trading
with the Enemy Act.
Under the 1969 Act, the Commerce Department had previously revised the Export
Administration Regulations on November 26, 1975 to require United States companies
to report requests to comply with foreign boycott demands, but these reports were to
be kept confidential. President Ford on October 7, 1976, however, ordered the
Department of Commerce to issue regulations requiring public disclosure of antiboycott reports filed with the Department by United States exporters.

EXPORTS

79

'2

cess; and two, many of the export items restricted by this method
served no strategic value and were available in similar quantity and
comparable quality from other sources. Both H.R. 15377 and S.3084
contained provisions which would have ended these complaints.
Although the language of the two bills differed somewhat, both
would have made factors other than a country's communist or noncommunist status determinative of whether to impose export restrictions on goods shipped to that country. The more comprehensive
Senate bill provided for consideration of "the country's present and
potential relationship with the United States, the country's present
and potential relationship with countries friendly or hostile to the
United States, its ability and willingness to control retransfers of
United States exports in accordance with United States policy, and
3
such other factors as the President deems appropriate."
Both bills also required that consideration of the availability of
goods be made an integral part of the decision-making process. The
stronger provision was contained in H.R. 15377, which would have
made consideration of availability a direct feature of the licensing
process. This would have been accomplished by prohibiting the
President from imposing export controls, for national security reasons,
on goods which he determined were available in comparable quantity
and quality from sources outside the United States, unless he determined that adequate evidence had been presented to him which
demonstrated that the absence of export controls would prove detri4
mental to the national security of the United States.
The House and Senate bills also contained provisions relating to
foreign boycotts in an attempt to offset the "growing domestic impact
of the Arab boycott against Israel." The legislation was aimed at: 1) the
"primary" boycott of Arab nations against Israel; 2) the " econdary"
boycott by Arab nations of firms doing business with Israel or with
Israli entities; and 3) the "tertiary" boycott by which American firms
are prohibited from doing business with other American firms which
have economic relations with Israel, or which have Jewish ownership,
management or employees.

2

122 Cong. Record 14897 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1976) (remarks of Senator Steven-

son).
3 The House bill, H.R. 15377, would have provided consideration of whether the
exports "make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation
or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States."
4 S. 3084 would have given consideration of availability an indirect role in the
licensing process. It would have required the President, through the Secretary of
Commerce, to review existing unilateral and multilateral controls on goods to
determine whether they should be "removed, modified, or added with respect to
particular articles, materials, supplies, including technological data, and other information in order to protect national security."
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The House bill contained much stiffer provisions on foreign
boycotts. It would have prohibited all American firms from taking "any
action with intent to comply with or to further or to support any trade
boycott fostered or imposed by any foreign country against a country
friendly to the United States, and which is not itself the object of any
form of embargo." The legislation would have prohibited American
firms from refusing to do business with other United States companies
as a condition for trading with a foreign country. It would have further
prohibited United States companies from discriminating against other
firms or individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin or nationality, and prohibited them from providing information
in these areas. Under the House bill, any United States firm receiving
requests from a foreign country for information pursuant to a foreign
boycott would have been required to file a report for public release
with the Secretary of Commerce. 5
With regard to penalties imposed for violations of the export
controls, the Senate bill was comparable to that of the House. Both bills
would have provided that a company or individual alleging injury as a
result of a violation of the antiboycott provision could bring an action
for treble damages in civil court. For general violations of the Act or
regulations thereunder, both bills would have increased the maximum
judicial penalties from $10,000 to $25,000 for knowing violations, and
from $25,000 to $50,000 where the violator knew that the export would
be used for the benefit of any country to which control provisions had
been applied for national security reasons.
Upon the September 30, 1976 expiration of the Export Administration Act, President Ford issued an Executive Order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to continue administering the program. The
President cited Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act as the
basis for this authorization. Section 5(b) of the Enemy Act allows the
President "during time of war or during any period of national
emergency declared by the President," and "under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe," to "investigate, regulate, or prohibit
any exportation of any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest." Although this same section had
been utilized on previous occasions, this was the first time that an
Executive Order had been issued under Section 5(b) to continue export
controls for what realistically can be expected to be from six months to

5 While the Senate Bill contained provisions similar to those in the House version
with respect to refusals to do business, discrimination, and public disclosure, it would
not have actually prohibited American businesses from taking other action in compliance with foreign boycott demands. It would have only encouraged and requested
United States exporters from doing so. This language was consistent with the 1969
Act, and was drafted in recognition that, under existing law, efforts to implement the
antiboycott policy have been largely "weak and ineffective."
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one year. 6 The statutory question thus raised by the September 30
Executive Order is whether Section 5(b) authorizes continuation of the
export control program during a "nonemergency" period.
Those doubting the President's authority in this instance, as well
as those supporting it, cite United States v. Yoshida International, Inc.,
526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A., 1975) as giving their position legal foundation.
The Yoshida case upheld the validity of the import surcharge imposed
by President Nixon in an Executive Order issued in 1971 under Section
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. The court found that the
President had acted properly in the face of a perceived emergency, that
his order affected only the period of emergency and was not "applicable to normal conditions on a continuing basis." It concluded that "the
President's action in imposing the surcharge bore an eminently
reasonable relationship to the emergency confronted." Based on this
decision, possible weaknesses in President Ford's statutory position
are: he has actually taken over the trade functions vested exclusively in
the Congress by the Constitution, whereas the presidential action in
Yoshida only supplemented the existing trade and tariff laws during the
emergency; President Ford's action is applicable to normal conditions
on a continuing basis, unlike the situation in Yoshida; and, perhaps, the
President's action bears no reasonable relation to the emergency
because, arguably, the soundest solution to a balance of payments
problem is not to restrict exports, but to expand them.
Assuming that the President is within the provisions of Section
5(b) of the Enemy Act, a second problem is raised by the Commerce
Department's issuance of new export regulations. Since the export
control program is being administered under the Trading with the
Enemy Act, rules and regulations implementing the export control
policy must be made in compliance with the Administrative Procedure
Act. 7 Two basic requirements of that Act are: (1) agencies shall publish
proposed rules in the Federal Register and allow at least 30 days for
comment by the public before the regulations are issued; and (2) final
regulations will not become effective until 30 days after they have been
adopted and published. President Ford's October 7 memorandum
directed the Secretary of Commerce to issue new regulations requiring
public disclosure of antiboycott reports, but no provision was made for
public comment on the proposed regulations. In addition, the regulations became effective on October 7, but were not published in the
6 Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act was utilized once in 1972 and
twice in 1974 by Presidents Nixon and Ford, respectively, to maintain export controls
while Congress completed action to extend the Export Administration Act. The
periods of time involved there, however, were less than one month.
7 Section 8 of the Export Administration Act provided that functions authorized
by the Act were excluded from the operation of the rule-making, adjudication, or
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Trading with the
Enemy Act contains no such provision.
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Federal Register until October 13. There is no apparent compliance
with the Administrative Procedure Act.
The significance of export controls virtually insures that legislation
will be introduced in the 95th Congress to revive the Export Administration Act of 1969. The two bills which failed to be enacted in the 94th
Congress give some indication of what might be the priorities of the
new legislation. For the present, exports will continue to be controlled
by the regulations issued pursuant to the President's Executive Order.
In general, these regulations continue the basic policy of the 1969 Act.
Furthermore, until new legislation is enacted, the executive branch
may well face some litigation concerning its authority over exports and
its method of issuing new regulations.

TAXATION-The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 10612, October 4, 1976.
In the area of international taxes, the Tax Reform Act of 1976
[hereinafter cited as Act] made changes in existing provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.*] and added
new provisions that did not exist prior to the Act. These changes
should have significant effects upon taxpayers involved in international trade.
Among the additions made by the Act are provisions relating to
cooperation with or participation in international boycotts. These
additions may be categorized either as new reporting requirements or
as new provisions affecting the amount of taxes due.
Under the new reporting requirements, all taxpayers are required
to report whether they have participated in or cooperated with, or
were requested to participate in or cooperate with, an international
boycott. Act § 1064, I.R.C. § 999(a). To aid the taxpayers in complying
with the reporting requirements, the Secretary of the Treasury is
required to maintain and publish a list of countries that require or may
require participation in an international boycott. Act § 1064, I.R.C. §
999(a)(3). Criminal penalties are provided for willful failure to file
reports required under the new provisions. Act § 1064, I.R.C. §999(f).
The new provisions that affect the amount of tax due provide that
to the extent a taxpayer's income is attributable to participation in an
international boycott, it does not qualify for certain tax benefits: the
income will not quality for deferral through the use of a DISC, Act §
1063, I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(D)(ii); the foreign tax credit will not be allowed
for taxes imposed on that income, Act § 1061, I.R.C. § 908(a); and, if
*All citations to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are to those sections
as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
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earned by a controlled foreign corporation, that income is categorized
as Subpart F income, Act § 1062, I.R.C. § 952(a)(3).
The observance of boycott rules with respect to the origin or
destination of goods will not be treated as participation in or cooperation with an international boycott. Act § 1064, I.R.C. § 999(b)(4).
The Act makes significant changes in the amount of income that is
deemed distributed by a DISC. In addition to the denial of DISC
benefits to taxpayers who participate in international boycotts, the
DISC is now deemed to distribute a greater portion of its income if it
makes illegal bribes or kickbacks to government officials of any
country, Act § 1065(a)(2), I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F)(iii), if any portion its
income is attributable to military property, Act § 1101(a)(1), I.R.C. §
995(b)(1)(D), or if it has base period export gross receipts. Act §
1101(a)(1), I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(E).
The deemed distribution attributable to base period export gross
receipts will apply to all DISC's who have been exporting since 1975,
and will apply to other DISC's who continue exporting long enough to
have sales in a base period. Base period export gross receipts are
computed by averaging the export gross receipts of the years included
in the DISC's base period, and taking 67% of the resulting average. Act
§ 1101(a)(4), I.R.C. § 995(e). The DISC is deemed to distribute the
portion of its current income attributable to its base period export gross
receipts, and then to distribute one-half of -any remaining current
income. Act § 1063, I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F). For a DISC with level sales,
the effect of this change will be that its shareholders will be currently
taxed on approximately 831/2% (67% as being attributable to its base
period export gross receipts plus one-half of the remaining 33%). The
amount currently taxable to the shareholders as a deemed distribution
will be less than 831/2% for the DISC that is able to increase its export
gross receipts, and will be greater than 831/2% for the DISC whose
export gross receipts decrease.
Under prior law, the taxpayer had the choice of using either the
per-country limitation or the overall limitation in determining the
allowable foreign tax credit. The Act repeals the per-country method of
computing the allowable foreign tax credit for years beginning after
December 31, 1976. Act § 1031(a). Limited exceptions to the repeal of
the per-country limitation are made in the cases of taxpayers presently
engaged in foreign mining ventures, Act § 1031(c)(2), and in the cases
of United States possessions source income. Act § 1031(c)(3).
Under the overall method of computing the foreign tax credit
allowable, the taxpayer is required to allocate his income between that
from United States sources and income from foreign sources. The
maximum allowable credit is a pro rata portion of the United States
taxes allocated to the foreign source income. Several provisions of the
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Act affect the allocation of income between United States sources and
foreign sources, and thus affect the maximum allowable credit.
Taxpayers will now generally be required to recapture any overall
foreign losses in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975 by
treating a portion of any subsequent foreign source income as United
States source income. Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. § 904(f). The amount of
income so recharacterized is generally limited to 50% of the taxpayer's
foreign source income, unless the taxpayer elects a higher percentage.
Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. § 904(f)(1)(B). In no event will more income be
recharacterized than the taxpayer has accumulated as overall foreign
losses. Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. § 904(f)(1). Foreign expropriation losses,
casualty losses, net operating losses, and capital loss carrybacks and
carryovers are not to be taken into account in determining the amount
of the overall foreign losses, and thus are not subject to the recapture
provisions. Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. § 904(0(2).
Special rules are provided for the -recapture of overall foreign
losses if the taxpayer disposes of property that was used predominantly in a trade or business outside the United States. Act § 1032(a),
I.R.C. § 904(0(3). In the event of such a disposition, the taxpayer is
required to recognize gain to the extent the fair market value of the
property exceeds its adjusted basis. Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. §
904(f)(3)(A)(i). The gain so recognized is limited to the amount of the
overall foreign losses that have not been recaptured. Act § 1032(a),
I.R.C. § 904(f)(3)(A)(i). If any gain is recognized because of the
disposition, that entire gain is subject to recharacterization as United
States, source income, without regard to the general fifty percent
limitation. Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. § 904(f)(3)(A)(ii). The taxpayer may
avoid recognition of gain on disposition if the property is not a material
factor in the realization of income or if the disposition is to a domestic
corporation in a qualifying tax-free transfer. Act § 1032(a), I.R.C. §
904(f)(3)(C).
For purposes of allocating capital gains between United States
source income and foreign source income, several changes are made.
First, foreign source income cannot include capital gains on the sale of
personal property unless the gain is subject to a foreign tax of at least
10%. Act § 1034(a), I.R.C. § 904(b)(3)(C). Second, for corporate
taxpayers, only five-eighths of foreign capital gains may be included in
foreign source income. Act § 1034(a), I.R.C. § 904(b)(2)(A). Third, for
all taxpayers, foreign source capital gains cannot exceed the taxpayer's
total capital gains included in arriving at the total taxable income for
the year. Act § 1034(a), I.R.C. §§ 904(b)(A), 904(b)(2)(B).
The Act generally abolishes the favored tax treatment afforded to
dividends and gain on the sale of stock of less-developed country
corporations. Act § 1033. For years beginning after December 31, 1975,
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with certain exceptions, these dividends and gains will be treated the
same as those attributable to developed country corporations.
Under prior law, advance rulings were required in order for
reorganizations involving foreign corporations to quality as tax-free.
The Act now distinguishes between reorganizations that involve
transfers of property out of the United States, and reorganizations that
involve transfers of property into the United States. In the case of
transfers out, a ruling may now be obtained up to 183 days after the
exchange has begun and still preserve the tax-free character of the
reorganization. Act § 1042(a), I.R.C. § 367. In the case of transfers into
the United States, an advance ruling is no longer required.
The Act broadens the categories of assets in which a controlled
foreign corporation is allowed to invest without causing its United
States shareholders to have taxable income. The controlled foreign
corporation may now invest in either stocks or bonds of domestic
corporations, provided that the domestic corporation in which the
investment is made is not a shareholder of the controlled foreign
corporation and the United States shareholders of the controlled
foreign corporation do not own 25% or more of the stock. of the
domestic corporation. Act § 1021(a), I.R.C. § 956(b)(2)(F).
Other changes made by the Act affect non-resident alien individuals married to United States citizens or residents, the determination of
Subpart F income of shipping and insurance companies, foreign oil
and gas extraction income, losses of foreign banks, China Trade Act
corporations, employees of United States businesses working overseas, foreign trusts, possessions corporations, interest on United
States deposits, source of underwriting income, insurance companies
doing business in Canada and Mexico through branches, Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporations, and excise tax on transfers to foreign
entities. Because of their limited applicability or their applicability
more directly to individuals than to businesses, they have not been
included in this note.
FISHERIES-Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
On April 13, 1976, President Ford signed the Fishery Management
and Conservation Act of 1976. Effective March 1, 1977, the Act
unilaterally extends the exclusive fisheries jurisdiction of the United
States from the present twelve mile area to a zone two hundred miles
in width.
The unilateral action came at the outset of the 1976 sessions of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and was
intended in part to give further impetus to that body. There is tacit
agreement within the conference on the basic principles governing
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access to and use of fisheries, but disputes over sea-bed mining are
preventing the adoption of a sea law convention. The Act implements
the two hundred mile zone that is perceived to be generally acceptable
to the conference, and seeks to demonstrate to third world holdouts
that unilateral action by world powers could present their delegations
with a fait accompli. The Act also offers the promise of quick relief for
nearly depleted United States fisheries.
The new law asserts control over all fish within the two hundred
mile zone and retains control previously held over sea life that remains
in contact with the continental shelf. 16 U.S.C. § 1085. Control over
anadromous species (river spawning fish, such as salmon) of the
United States is extended to wherever they roam outside other nations'
fishery zones. 16 U.S.C. § 1812. Highly migratory species such as tuna
are specifically exempted from control. 16 U.S.C. § 1813. The law
declares that the United States will not recognize another nation's
extraterritorial fishing zones unless that nation similarly recognizes
that highly migratory species are to be under international control. 16
U.S.C., § 1822(e)(2). Thus, the Act regulates the taking of United States
salmon in international waters while declaring that no nation may
unilaterally restrict the taking of tuna within its own zone. Sanctions
against uncooperative nations include the withholding of fishing
privileges in the United States zone and restraints on importation of
those nations' fish products. 16 U.S.C. § 1825.
State regulation of fisheries is limited to the territorial area within
three miles of the state's coastal baseline. The only extraterritorial
power given to the state is the power to regulate vessels registered
under the laws of that state. If a state's management of a fishery
conflicts with the Federal Management Plan, the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to regulate the fishery within the state's boundary
(excluding internal waters). The probability of such conflicts is reduced
however by the role that the coastal states will have in the formulation
of the Federal Management Plan. National fishery management will be
conducted through eight regional councils. Voting members of the
councils will include the principal state fishery official of each constituent state. Other voting members will be appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from a list of qualified individuals submitted by the
Governors of the constituent states, with at least one member being
appointed from each state. 16 U.S.C. § 1852. Each council will be
supported by its own staff and will receive technical services from
federal agencies. Regional plans are to be reviewed, coordinated and
implemented by the Secretary of Commerce, who will make provisions
for publication of, and public hearings on, proposed regulations.
Enforcement provisions vest the federal district courts with the
power to impose strict civil and criminal penalties on violators. Due to
the vast size of the zone, the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary
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having control of the Coast Guard (currently the Secretary of Transportation) may utilize the services of any state or federal agency, including
the Defense Department, in their enforcement efforts. 16 U.S.C. §
1861.
To insure that future international fishery agreements are in
accordance with the Act, Congress included a provision requiring that
such agreements become effective only after Congressional examination and absent a joint resolution rejecting them. 16 U.S.C. § 1823.
President Ford sees this provision as an invasion of the power of the
executive over foreign relations. Statement by the President upon
Signing H.R. 200 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOc. 644 (April

13, 1976).
Congress passed the act against the advice of the State Department. H. R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1975). The Department is concerned that this type of unilateral action will undermine
international efforts in general, and may encourage other nations to
make claims over strategic ocean areas, thus injuring United States
interests. However, Congiess apparently feels that the economic
advantages of the Act will outweigh any negative international effects.

INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS-Protocols for
the Third Extension of the International Wheat Agreement,
1971, Exec. Doc. I, 94th Congress, 2d Session; International
Coffee Agreement 1976, Exec. Doc. H, 94th Congress, 2d
Session; Fifth International Tin Agreement, Exec. Doc. J, 94th
Congress, 2d Session; 14 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1149 (1975).
Before the 94th Congress adjourned at the end of September 1976,
the Senate ratified multilateral commodity agreements for wheat,
coffee and tin. This action marks further acceptance by the United
States of international control over primary commodities. The United
States has long recognized the need to stabilize prices for producer
nations and to insure supplies for consumer nations, but its free trade
policies have made it hostile to market interference. These new
agreements illustrate the use of three generally accepted mechanisms
for regulating international commodity markets. These mechanisms
are multilateral sales contracts, export quotas, and buffer stocks. While
the United States has previously been willing to enter into agreements
utilizing sales contracts and export quotas, the current tin agreement
marks the first time that the United States has countenanced the use of
buffer stocks. The government emphasizes, however, that it has not
abandoned its free market goals and objectives.
The least innovative of the three agreements which were ratified is
the Third Extension of the 1971 International Wheat Agreement
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[IWA]. I The IWA, thereby extended until June 30, 1978, consists of two
parts: the Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid Convention
[FAC]. The Trade Convention provides a forum for international
cooperation and consultation in gathering and disseminating data on

the international wheat situation. The Food Aid Convention obligates
the parties to provide developing nations with minimal annual quantities of food aid or its cash equivalent. This Extension makes no effort
to regulate the market by use of the three control mechanisms. Since

the International Grains Arrangement was destroyed in 1969 by the
adverse operation of the internal agricultural policies of the exporters
and by concessional transactions which lay outside the system, 2 the
major importing and exporting nations remain hesitant to conclude

multilateral contracts to reduce the fluctuation of prices.
Ratification of the extended IWA merely maintains United States

membership in the International Wheat Council, the body which
implements the Wheat Trade Convention. Continued participation ir.
the Food Aid Convention obligates the United States to do no more
than it is committed to do under present concessional sales and other

bilateral AID programs. 3 Former Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz
stated however, at the time of signature, that the United States would
not deposit its instrument of ratification for the Food Aid Convention

until the EEC, the other major donor under the FAC, affirmed its
obligations by ratifying the agreement. 4 The United States has taken

this position because the EEC has had difficulty in obtaining clearance
for the agreement from among its member nations. The United States
does not wish to be the sole major donor in a multilateral program
when it would donate the same amount of grain through bilateral
arrangements in any case.

The 1976 International Coffee Agreement s attempts to stabilize
prices of the developing world's largest agricultural export through the
use of export quotas and various stockpiling incentives. After the
1
Protocols for the Third Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971,
entered into force June 19, 1976, and July 1, 1976; United States declaration of
provisional application with statement deposited June 17, 1976, ratified by Senate on
August 23, 1976. For the legislative history, see Exec. Doc. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Exec. Rep. No. 94-31, Aug. 23, 1976. For previous agreements, see Note, International
Commodity Agreements, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275,n.80 (1976).
2
Schram, International Repercussions of National Farm Policies: A Look at American
Programs,3 LAW & POLIcY IN INT'L Bus. 239, 296-318 (1971).
Wheat
3
Note, supra note 1, at 297.
4
Exec. Doc. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at v.
slnternational Coffee Agreement 1976, with annexes. Approved by International
Coffee Council Dec. 3, 1975; open for signaturefrom Jan. 31 through July 31, 1976, not in
force; ratified by Senate Aug. 23, 1976, instrument of ratification signed by President
Sept. 21, 1976. For legislative history, see Exec. Doc. H, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.; referred
to Foreign Relation Committee April 5, 1976; reported Exec. Rep. No. 94-32 Aug. 23,
1976.
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failure of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968,6 and the suspension of all export restrictions on coffee in December 1972, 7 the International Coffee Organization continued in an informational and consultative function similar to that of the International Wheat Council.
Negotiations to reinstate regulatory mechanisms in the new Agreement have resulted in a commodity control scheme expressly aimed at
improving the stability of foreign exchange earnings in developing
countries which depend heavily on coffee as a source of foreign
income. 8
Unlike the normal glut situation which it faced during negotiation
of prior International Coffee Agreements in 1962 and 1968, the world
coffee market now faces a supply shortage. Production has dropped
dramatically due to the July 1975 frost in Brazil and disruptions in the
coffee trade in Angola and Guatemala. 9 Consequently, the new sixyear Agreement contains a number of changes which are intended to
stimulate supplies and aid importing nations. It retains the export
quota system, however, to deal with future surpluses.
Specifically, the Agreement suspends the operation of the quota
system until such time as the market price drops below its 1975
average. Article 33. The method by which basic export quotas are
established provides an incentive for member exporting nations to ship
all available coffee during the present shortage. If reimposed after the
1976-77 season, quotas will be calculated on the basis of shipments
during 1976-77 and subsequent seasons. Article 30. Consequently,
exporting nations will attempt to protect their interests in a higher
quota by shipping as much coffee as possible for the duration of the
shortage.
When and if reimposed, the quota system will have other changes.
In addition to the basic quota calculated on the basis of past shipments,
each producer nation will have a variable quota based upon the
percentage of total world stockpiles held by that nation. Article 35.
This provision is intended to encourage producers to hold production
in excess of quotas in national stockpiles rather than sell excess
production to nonmember nations with the result of driving down
prices. Small producers (under 400,000 bags) are given special consideration through a system of automatic annual increases in their quotas,
which will initially be set at the 1976-77 level of production. Article 31.
To assist in smoothing supply fluctuations and thus aid price stability,
61nt'l Coffee Agreement, opened for signature, Mar. 18-31, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6333,
T.I.A.S. No. 6584, 647 U.N.T.S. 3 (1968). For previous agreements, see Note, supra
note 1, at 288, n.86.
77 J. OF WORLD TRADE LAW 375 (1973).
8
Preamble to the Int'l Coffee Agreement 1976; Exec. Doc., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at
2 Exec. Rep. No. 94-30 at 1.
9
Exec. Doc. H at vi; Exec. Rep. No. 94-30 at 3; Wall St. Journal, Oct. 28, 1976, at 36,

col. 2.
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exporters are encouraged to declare expected shortfalls from their
quota in any season. The amount of the excess quota will then be
distributed to other members, and the nation with the shortfall will be
allowed to compensate by increasing its later annual quotas. Article 40.
The International Coffee Council will establish a policy relating to
national coffee stocks, and will study the feasibility of an international
stock arrangement. Article 51.
Whereas the 1968 Agreement provided for a fund financed by a
levy on exported bags which was to help producers with economic
diversification, the new Agreement creates only a fund for promotion
of increased consumption. Article 47. While this would seem to
indicate a return to one-crop dependence, the Agreement also contains
provisions encouraging processing of coffee in the producer nations.
Article 46. This change from the previous agreement's prohibition of
producer processing will allow greater development, if not diversification, of producer nation economies.
Two other features of the Agreement are worthy of note: the
voting provision and the termination provisions. Because of the system
of votingused, both the United States and Brazil will have more votes
than the one-third necessary to block Council decisions. Thus both
nations will effectively be able to veto any action on the regulation of
exports and imports. Article 3, §§ 5 and 10; Annex 2. Furthermore, the
termination provisions allow any party to withdraw from the Agreement after three years (October 1, 1979) simply by failing to give
notification of an intent to renew participation. Article 68. This arrangement casts some doubt on the long-term effectiveness of the
agreement, since the supply shortage will probably persist until after
1979.10 Thus the parties have only bound themselves to a quota system

which will probably not go into effect before they have a chance to
escape from its provisions.
The third commodity arrangement, The Fifth International Tin
Agreement," is the first tin agreement to which the United States has
become a party. The Agreement utilizes export controls and a buffer
stock arrangement to stabilize tin price levels. The four previous tin
agreements have been successful in maintaining a floor price, but have
'°Since one-half of the coffee trees were destroyed in Brazil, and it takes three
years for trees to reach maturity, high prices and a supply shortage seem assured for
at least a year. Exec. Doc. H, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at vi; Exec. Rep. No. 94-30 at 5.
"t Fifth International Tin Agreement, 14 TNT'L LEG. MAT. 1149; U.N. Doc. T.D./TIN.
5/10 (1975), open for signature July 1, 1975, April 30, 1976, entered into force provisionally
July 1, 1976; United States declaration of intention to ratify, deposited June 29, 1976,
ratified by Senate Sept. 15, 1976. See generally Exec. Doc. J 94th Cong., 2d Sess.;
referred to Foreign Relations Committee June 23, 1976; reported Exec. Rep. No. 94-37
Sept 8, 1976. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 288 n.88.
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not been able to establish a tin price ceiling. 12 The failure to establish a
ceiling price is a result of the buffer stock never reaching a level at
which sales from the stock could effectively offset declining supplies.
exception in
Floor prices, however, have been maintained (with one
13
quotas.
export
of
use
successful
but
rare
1958) by the
The United States has cooperated in the past with the International Tin Council by selling from the strategic tin stockpile which it
accumulated during the 1950's. United States ratification of the new
Agreement thus marks a de jure acceptance of the arrangement which
has actually existed since the Second Agreement in order to further
foreign policy aims. 14 Senate ratification was not unanimous, how16
ever, 15 as it was in the case of the wheat and coffee agreements.
Domestic consumers feared that United States ratification of the Agreement would result in the United States becoming a party to a cartel that
would control the strategic stockpile, with the result that it would be
unavailable to them in the event of a future shortage. 17 Their fears
should be allayed, however, by government announcements that no
voluntary contributions will be made to the Council buffer stock, that
the Council recommendations will in no sense be binding on decisions
for disposal of the United States stockpile, and that such provisions of
the Agreement will constitute no change in United States practice. 18 The
concessions made to the United States in the Agreement, such as the
provision stating that the Council can recommend that producers give
consuming countries party to the Agreement preference during periods
of tin shortage (Article 40), are thus not offset by any review of the
present system of voluntary contributions to the buffer stock by consuming countries. Article 22. Minor changes made to strengthen the buffer
stock, and other ameliorations in the allocation and removal of export
controls, will probably do little to strengthen the Agreement. While
United States ratification is an important benchmark for the International Tin Agreement, the United States has not changed its policy or
made any sacrifice of its national interest in order to ratify. Successful
maintenance of a ceiling price for tin should be as elusive under the Fifth
Agreement as under the first four.

'12U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, REPORT TO THE

SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE OF THE FINANCE Comm., Govt. Doc. No. Y4.F49, at 9-10, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
1310 J. OF WORLD TRADE LAW 95 (1976); Exec. Doc. J at vi; INT'L COMMODITY
at 10.
AGREEMENTS
14
Exec. Rep. No. 94-37 at 17.
15122 CONG. REc. 15,866 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976). The vote was 71-17.
"6Supra notes 1 and 5. The vote on these agreements was 85-0.
' 7 Exec. Rep. No. 94-37 at 16.
18
Exec. Doc. J at vii.
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FOREIGN BANK REGULATION-Foreign Bank Act of 1975, S.958,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1975).
The Foreign Bank Act of 1975 (S.958), as introduced on March 5,
1975, was intended to provide for the federal regulation, supervision
and examination of foreign bank operations in the United States. This
legislative proposal was submitted by the Federal Reserve System and
referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs. The Committee failed to report the Act to the Senate, and
further action is contingent upon the Act's re-introduction in the next
Congress. However, the Act is illustrative of the approach to reform of
foreign bank activities favored by the Federal Reserve System.
George W. Mitchell, spokesman for the Federal Reserve, cited to
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions three major reasons why
federal regulation of foreign bank operations is desirable. First, due to
the rapid growth of foreign bank activity in the United States, these
institutions exercise considerable influence on domestic money and
credit markets, and on international fund flows. Secondly, the lack of
uniform federal regulation and the inconsistency of state regulation
create inequitable competitive conditions for both domestic and
foreign banks. And thirdly, a reasonably certain national pattern of
regulation is necessary to foster desirable long range bank planning
and development in this and other countries. Federal legislation
standardizing the national treatment of foreign banks would create a
favorable investment climate in this country, encourage other countries to adopt similar reforms, and thus contribute to the development
of international standards of banking soundness and competition.
Central to the concern of the Federal Reserve is the fact that
foreign banks are almost exclusively controlled by state legislation. By
operating through branches and agency forms of organization, the
foreign banks are able to avoid federal regulations that have the
greatest potential for insuring the achievement of national economic
policies. The regulatory advantages available to foreign banks include
the following:
1. Foreign bank branches and agencies are not legally subject to
any of the reserve requirements or other regulations affecting
monetary policy.
2. Foreign bank branches and agencies are not subject to any
federal restrictions on multi-state banking and thus can be established in any state that permits entry.
3. A foreign bank maintaining only branches and agencies is not
subject to the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act, which disallows the concurrent ownership of a securities firm in the United
States.

FOREIGN BANK REGULATION
4. Foreign bank branches and agencies are not subject to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, and thus the foreign bank can
engage directly or indirectly in any nonbanking activity authorized
under the laws of its home country.
5. Foreign bank branches and agencies are not subject to any
federal bank examination, regulation, or supervision of the type
carried out by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Reserve Board, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).
Foreign banks are also subject to restraints on entry, and to state
treatment which fosters anticompetitive banking conditions. Foreign
banks presently cannot organize the Edge Corporation subsidiaries that
enable large United States banks to conduct international banking
operations in several cities that serve as centers of international trade
financing. The National Bank Act requirement that all directors of
national banks be United States citizens acts as an additional bar to
federally chartered branches, and forces foreign banks to organize
state subsidiaries. Moreover, federal law fails to provide for the
establishment of federal branches by foreign banks, so foreign banks
are further encouraged to establish state subsidiaries and branches.
Since FDIC insurance is not available for deposits and credit balance
accounts at foreign bank branches and agencies, foreign banks are at a
competitive disadvantage in the retail banking markets. State controls
may also deny entry to a foreign bank, and thus provoke retaliation
against a state bank by that foreign country.
Designed to encourage equal opportunities for both foreign and
domestic banks, the Foreign Bank Act offers several proposed reforms.
The citizenship requirement for directors of national banks would be
relaxed. By allowing the Comptroller of the Currency the discretion to
permit one-third of the directors to be non-citizens of the United
States, the Act would give foreign banks the opportunity to establish a
national rather than a state subsidiary (Section 12). Foreign banks
would be given the opportunity to establish both federal and state
branches (Section 18). By amendment to the Edge Act, foreign banks
with Federal Reserve Board approval would be allowed to acquire Edge
Corporation subsidiaries (Section 10). The Act would also direct
amendment of the FDIC Act to permit branches and agencies to obtain
insurance on deposit and credit accounts held in the United States
(Section 17).
The Foreign Bank Act would alter the regulatory scope of the Bank
Holding Company Act by changing the definition of "Bank" to include
branches and agencies of foreign banks established or operating under
the laws of the United States, any state or the District of Columbia. As a
result of this and other provisions, foreign banks would face substan-
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tially expanded regulation under federal law. To insure adequate and
equal national regulation of both foreign and domestic banks, S.958
offered the following regulatory scheme:
1. Foreign banks with world wide assets in excess of $500,000,000
must become a member of the Federal Reserve System.
2. Foreign bank branches and agencies will be subject to federal
monetary and federal bank examination, regulatory and supervisory controls that attach with Federal Reserve membership.
3. Foreign bank branches and subsidiaries will become subject to
the requirements of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Bank Merger Act,
the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, and other
provisions of the FDIC Act.
4. All foreign bank branches and agencies will have to become
FDIC-insured banks.
5. Additional foreign bank branches and agencies can only be
established with Federal Reserve Board approval.
6. Foreign bank branches and agencies cannot be established
outside the state of a foreign bank's principal United States
banking operations, unless the state of principal operation provides reciprocal treatment for foreign banks operating principally
in the second state which seek to establish their own branches in
the principal state.
7. Parent foreign banks and their non-banking subsidiaries would
be subject to the Federal Reserve System's cease-and-desist authority for unsafe 'and unsound practices.
The increasing influence of foreign investors and banking institutions stimulated the introduction of several bills in Congress
designed to monitor and regulate foreign investment and financial
activity. Among them were the Foreign Investment Act, S.425,
H.R.7578. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (noted at 1 N.C.J.Int'l L. &
Comm.Reg. 88) and the Foreign Government Investment Control Act,
S.995, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (noted at 1 N.C.J.Int'l L; &
Comm.Reg. 91). While some of the other bills would have mandated
sweeping changes in United States policy toward foreign investment,
S.958 was no departure from the existing open door policy. The Act
was similar in this regard to Public Law 93-479 (88 Stat. 1450),
approved October 26, 1974, which authorized the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury to study, analyze, and report on the effects of
foreign direct and portfolio investment in the United States. President
Ford, upon signing the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, reaffirmed the existence of an open door policy. S.958 attempted to further
this policy by removing foreign banks from the exclusive control of
varying state laws, and by placing these concerns under no more
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onerous federal regulation than that which confronts domestic banks.
S.958 would not have supplanted state regulation or removed options
for state chartering or licensing. Instead it would have established
federal controls on foreign banks only to the extent domestic banks are
so regulated. Should legislation to alter regulation of foreign banks be
introduced in the 95th Congress, it is very likely to follow the
objectives and policies of S.958.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES-The Multilateral Trade
Negotiations:1976, compiled from Commerce America and The
Multilateral Trade Negotiations News
Throughout 1976, the major industrialized nations and the less
developed countries (LDC's) of the world continued to participate in
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), seeking to help the international economy advance beyond the present period of recovery into a
sustainable period of expansion. The different areasof the negotiations
have experienced varying degrees of progress toward this goal of
expanding and liberalizing international trade.
The current round of the MTN, called the "Tokyo Round" for the
Tokyo Declaration which formally opened the negotiations, is dealing
with a wide range of barriers to trade, the most significant of which are
tariffs. The MTN Tariffs Group made progress on three key elements
of the tariff negotiations: the tariff reduction formula, rules and
procedures for exceptions to the formula, and special treatment for
products of importance to LDC's..
Following extensive consultations with representatives of private
enterprise and with Congress, the United States negotiators proposed
a comprehensive tariff reduction formula. A substantial majority of the
trade of developed countries involves imports which are taxed at a rate
of five to fifteen percent for tariff purposes. Under the proposal of the
United States, the reduction of duties would be concentrated on these
imports. As a result, the access to the markets of the developed
countries would be more equitable among the developed countries and
more favorable to the LDC's. The United States formula attempts to
achieve these objectives by utilizing "harmonization" and "linear"
elements in its plan. Harmonization, meaning that the amount of tariff
reduction depends upon the current duty level, would result in higher
duties being decreased more than lower ones. Linear reduction refers
to an across-the-board cut by a fixed percentage, independent of the
duty level.
Subsequently, the European Community proposed its own tariff
reduction formula which relied solely on the harmonization approach.
The United States responded to this proposal with criticism on two
grounds. Although the proposal is theoretically aimed at high duties,
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the United States pointed out that such duties rarely exist in the tariff
profiles of the industrialized nations. Before any exceptions for various
products are taken into account, the proposal of the European Community would achieve only a small reduction of duties in the five to
fifteen percent tariff range which is the major area of concern to the
United States. The proposed formula of the United States would
reduce the five to fifteen percent duties more significantly and would
achieve actual harmonization to a greater extent than would the
proposal of the European Community.
The United States also criticized the Community's formula because it would "except" agricultural products, the area in which
practically all of the high tariffs of the Community exist. The Community has always felt that only the MTN Agriculture Group should
negotiate concerning the duties on agricultural products; however, the
United States believes that agriculture and industry should be treated
together throughout the negotiations, especially when considering
tariffs and nontariff measures. The viewpoint of the United States
seems more in keeping with the general agreement of the MTN that
nations should exercise great restraint in excepting specific items from
the formula reduction.
Rules and procedures for exceptions are valuable because they
help to confine the scope of the negotiations by limiting deviations
from the tariff reduction formula. In addition to providing this discipline, such rules also serve as a bridge from the multilateral to the
bilateral phase of negotiations. For example, when nations bilaterally
negotiate for the reduction of duties on certain excepted products, they
often use these rules and procedures as guidelines for their negotiations and agreements. The importance of the form and depth of the
tariff reduction and of the .exceptions to the coverage of the formula is
demonstrated by the results of the Kennedy Round of the GATT
Negotiations (1962-1967). The Kennedy Round tariff formula was a
straight fifty percent linear cut; however, overall duties were reduced
an average of only thirty-five percent because of numerous exceptions.
The rule for exceptions during the Kennedy Round consisted of a
vague call to keep exceptions to the barest minimum, utilizing them
only when vital national interests were involved, thus combining the
concepts of a ceiling on total exceptions and of a standard to be met for
each exception. It remains to be seen whether the Tokyo Round of the
MTN will follow the consensus within the Tariffs Group that nations
should show maximum restraint in the area of exceptions as a starting
point for agreement upon definite rules and procedures necessary for a
significant decrease in tariffs.
Although LDC's are not expected to apply the tariff reduction
formula to their duties, for two primary reasons they remain very
interested in the negotiations over such a formula. First of all, LDC's
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desire at least a significant reduction in "tariff escalation", which
occurs when a developed country imposes low duties on primary
products, higher duties on semi-manufactures, and even higher duties
on finished products. LDC's view tariff escalation as a major obstacle to
diversifying their exports and moving from a dependence upon primary products of raw materials to the development of processing
industries. LDC's also want "special and differential treatment" on
products of export interest to them. The United States' proposal for a
tariff reduction formula would greatly decrease current levels of tariff
escalation and would provide for procedures under which specific
tariff problems of LDC's could be identified, thus furnishing a basis for
consideration of special and differential treatment.
In the present round of the MTN, a "special and priority sector"
for developing countries was established for negotiations on the
reduction of tariffs on tropical products. The LDC's consider the
progress of the Tropical Products Group to be the most important
indicator of their need to participate in the MTN. In response to
requests from thirty-seven LDC's for trade concessions on over 650
products, the United States and other developed nations offered lists
of tropical products on which they are willing to negotiate tariff
reductions. The United States carefully analyzed these requests for
import sensitivity before responding with its offer. The United States
also determined if the products were principally supplied by the LDC's
in order to insure that concessions would mainly benefit LDC's, and
not other developed countries, since the trade concessions of the
United States will be made on a Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) basis.
Under a MFN method, the concessions which are made to one country
will be granted equally to all others having this nondiscriminatory
status. The major issues on which the Tropical Products Group is still
negotiating concerns the degree of reciprocity in trade concessions that
the LDC's are willing to make. Only the United States expects the
LDC's to make contributions to the MTN, although the contributions
are not expected to be inconsistent with the individual LDC's trade,
financial and development needs. If the present offers for negotiation
of tariff reduction by the United States are fully implemented, it is
expected to reduce duties on approximately one billion dollars of
United States' imports. The United States feels that the scope and
depth of its tariff reduction will depend upon the extent of the LDC's'
contributions to trade liberalization.
The most significant progress in the MTN has occurred in the area
of nontariff measures (NTM's), and marks the world's initial effort at
dealing with a variety of nontariff distortions of international trade
during a major round of negotiations. The work on the NTM's is being
done in five areas: standards, quantitative restrictions, subsidies and
countervailing duties, government procurement practices, and cus-
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toms matters. A standards code is being drafted as a means of
resolving trade problems caused by the wide use of product standards,
and work in this area probably has advanced further than any other
phase of the NTM negotiations. The drafting of this standards code is a
response to the great difficulty in dealing with the trade barrier effects
of standards under the present GATT rules. Although GATT does not
have any specific provisions regarding standards, it gives member
nations far-reaching autonomy in the protection of life or health and
against deceptive practices. The draft standards code separately covers
the preparation, adoption and use of the following: mandatory standards by central governments, mandatory standards by local governmental bodies and regulatory bodies other than central governmental bodies, and voluntary standards. Publication of the mandatory
standards would be followed by a reasonable time period in which
foreign suppliers could adapt to the standard; however, there would
be a much shorter time period when pressing problems of health,
safety, environmental protection or na-tional security are involved.
Central governments would have to meet these requirements regarding the writing and use of their own standards; in addition, central
governments would have a "best efforts" obligation to ensure that local
governments and private standards-making bodies comply with the
requirements of the draft standards code. None of these product
standards should be unjustifiable obstacles to international trade.
Although the draft standards code cannot offer immediate solutions to
the numerous international trade problems caused by product standards, it can serve as a vehicle through which signatory nations may
seek solutions to these problems by means of consultation and cooperation.The pace of the MTN has been affected recently by economic
improvements in most major industrialized countries, which may
result in a lessening of some negotiating pressures and in facilitating
the process of agreement. However, the new President of the United
States, the upcoming national elections in several other major nations,
and the anticipated changes in the membership of the governing
Commission of the Common Market may lead to uncertainties which
will hinder the negotiations. One thing is certain-in order for the
MTN to reach its goal of expanding and liberalizing international trade
by the end of 1977, the overall momentum of the negotiations must
increase in the near future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following bibliography is selected from those books recently
published in the area of international business law which should be
interesting and useful to the practitioner and businessman., The list
includes treatises on both specific and general topics in the international area, as well as works which are useful primarily for reference
purposes.

Arbitration and Claims
Cherian, Joy. Investments Contracts and Abitration: The World Bank
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Leyden: A. W.
Sijthoff Publishing Co., 1975. 200 pp., $16.
Delaume, Georges. Transnational Contracts: Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976.
Two volumes, loose-leaf, $150.
Gaja, Giorgio. InternationalCommercialArbitration: Cases Under the New
York Convention. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976. 500
pp., loose-leaf.
Jackson, D.C. The "Conflicts" Process. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975. 440 pp., $22.50
Meron, Theodor. Investment Insurance and International Law. Dobbs
Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976. 960 pp., $65.
Schmitthoff, Clive M., Ed. International Commercial Arbitration. Dobbs
Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1974-75. Two volumes, $60/
volume.
Swidrowski, Josef. Exchange and Trade Controls; Principlesand Procedures
of International Economic Transactionsand Settlements. Epping, Eng.:
Gower Press Ltd., 1975. 342 pp., $32.50.
Concessions, Patents and Trademarks
Fischer, Peter, Ed. A Collection of International Concessions and Related
Instruments. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976. Ten
volumes, $40/volume.
Gevers, J. Patent Law and Practice of the Major European Countries.
Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1976. Three volumes, $45/volume.
Pennington, Robert R. European Patents at the Crossroads. New York:
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1976. One volume, $28.50.
Environmental and Energy Law
Alting von Geusau, Frans A.M., Ed. Energy in the European Communities. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff Publishing Co., 1975. 213 pp., F1
60.30.

100

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

British Institute of International and Comparative Law. International
Environmental Law: Proceedings. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1976. 300 pp., $16.
Gladwin, Thomas N. Environmental Planning and the Multinational
Corporation. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1976. 350 pp., $23.50.
Roster, Bernd, and Simma, Bruno. InternationalProtection of the Environment: Treaties and Related Documents. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1975-76. Ten volumes, $40/volume.
Foreign Law
A. Africa
Salacuse, Jeswald W. Introduction to Law in French-SpeakingAfrica, Vol.
II. Charlottesville: Michie Co., 1975. 542 pp., $25.
B. Australia
CCH Australia. Introduction to Trade Practices and Consumer Protection in
Australia. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1974. 249
pp., $9.95.
Weerasoria, W.S., and Coops, F.W. Banking Law and Practice in Australia. Chatswood, Austl.: Butterworth & Pty. Ltd., 1975. 420
pp., $25.
C. Canada
Langford, J.A. Canadian Foreign Investment Controls. Ontario: Commerce Clearing House, 1975. 106 pp.
Newberger, Edward L. Doing Business in Canada. New York: Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc., 1975. 306 pp.
D. European Economic Community
Barounos, Dimitri, Hall, D.F., and James, J. Rayner. EEC Antitrust Law.
London: Butterworth & Co., (Publishers) Ltd., 1975. 440 pp., $30.
George, Kenneth D., and Joll, Caroline. Competition Policy in the UK and
EEC. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975. £7.50.
Mathijsen, P.S.R. Guide to European Community Law, 2d Ed. New York:
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1975. 263 pp., £7.80.
Simmonds, Kenneth R. European Community Treaties. New York:
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1975. 309 pp., £4.50.
Slot, Pieter J. Technical and Administrative Obstacles to Trade in the EEC,
Including a Comparison with Interstate Trade Barriers in U.S.A.
Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff Publishing Co., 1975. 200 pp., $19.25.
E. Great Britain
Antonio, David G. Scots Law. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans,
Ltd., 1976. £2.
Dobson, A.P. Sale of Goods and Consumer Credit. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1975. 264 pp., £5.
George, Kenneth D., and Joll, Caroline. Competition Policy in the UK and
EEC (see Foreign Law, EEC above).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

101

Gheerbrant, P.A. Cases in Banking Law. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald &
Evans Ltd., 1976. £1.25.
Hudson, A.H., and Pennington, R.H. Commercial Banking Law.
Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd., 1976. £5.50.
Lewis, Mervyn. British Tax Law. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans
Ltd., 1976. £6.
Nicholls, Willis J. English Law for Business Studies, 3d Ed. New York:
Longmans Green & Co: Ltd., 1974. 419 pp., £3.60.
Ridley, Jasper, and Whitehead, G. Law of the Carriageof Goods by Land,
Sea and Air, 4th Ed. London: Shaw & Sons Ltd., 1975. 287 pp., $8.
F. Middle East
Maged, Mark. Legal Aspects of Doing Business with Egypt, Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States. New York: Practising Law Institute,
1975. 353 pp., $30.
G. West Germany
Brficher, Horst, and Pulch, Dieter. The German Law of Foreign Investment
Shares. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd., 1976. £4.25.
Mueller, Rudolf, Ed. GmbH [acronym for German limited liability
company]. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd., 1976. £3.
Mueller, Rudolf, and Schneider, Hannes. The German Law Against
Restraints of Competition. Plymouth, Eng.; Macdonald & Evans
Ltd., 1976. £4.25.
Mueller, Rudolf, Stiefel, Ernst, and Briicker, Horst. Doing Business in
Germany, 6th Ed. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd.,
1976. £6.
Oliver, Mary. The Private Company in Germany. Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd., 1976. £2.
Siebel, Ulf R. German Restrictions on Capital Transactionswith Foreigners.
Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd., 1976. £8.75.
Volhard, Riudiger, and Weber, Dolf. Real Property in Germany.
Plymouth, Eng.: Macdonald & Evans Ltd., 1976. £5.
Foreign Trade and Customs Law
Ahmed, Jaleel. Import Substitution, Trade and Development. Greenwich,
Conn.: JAI Press, April 1977. 250 pp., $18.75.
Demcy, Arthur I. How to Cope with Customs. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1976. 128 pp., $4.95.
European Association for Legal and Fiscal Studies. Product Liability in
Europe. London: Kluwer-Harrap Handbooks, 1975. 200 pp.,
£6.50.
Herman, A.H., and Jones, Colin. Fair Trading in Europe. Longon:
Kluwer-Harrap Handbooks, 1975. 336 pp., £9.
Johnston, Charles R., Jr. Law and Policy of Intergovernmental Primary
Commodity Agreements. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc.,
1976. Two volumes, loose-leaf, $125.

102

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Loeber, Dietrich A. East-West and IntersocialistTrade: A Sourcebook of the
Law. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975. Two volumes,
$75.
Mueller, Rudolf, Stiebel, Ernst and Brficher, Horst. Doing Business in
Germany (see Foreign Law, West Germany above).
Oliver, Robert W. InternationalEconomic Co-operationand the World Bank.
New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975. 421 pp., £10.
Shonfield, Andrew, and Strange, Susan. International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1976. Two volumes, £11.50/volume.
Slot, Pieter J. Technical and Administrative Obstacles to Trade in the EEC
Including a Comparison with Interstate Trade Barriers in U.S.A. (see
Foreign Law, EEC above).
Swidrowski, Josef. Exchange and Trade Controls (see Arbitration and
Claims above).
Wallenstein, Gerd. International Telecommunication Agreements. Dobbs
Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976. Three volumes, $75/
volume.
General Corporation Law
Boarman, Patrick M., and Schollhammer, Hans. Multinational Corporations and Governments: Business-Government Relations in an International Context. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975. 234 pp.,
$17.50.
Eells, Richard S.F. Global Corporations: The Emerging System of World
Economic Power. New York: The Free Press, 1976. 262 pp.
Elghatit, Aly H. TransnationalCorporate Law: A Study of Minimum Legal
Order. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976. Five to seven
volumes, $65/volume.
Fatemi, Nasrollah S., Williams, Gail W., and Saintphalle, Thibaut de.
Multinational Corporations, 2d Ed. Cranberry, N.J.: A.S. Barnes &
Co., Inc., 1976. 300 pp., $12.
Frommel, S.N., and Thompson, J.H. Company Law in Europe. London:
Kluwer-Harrap Handbooks, 1975. 400 pp., $31.75.
Gilpin, Robert. United States Power and the Multinatinal Corporation; The
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1975. 291 pp.
Goldman, Berthold. European Commercial Law, 2d Ed. New York:
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1973. One volume, $32.50.
Hawkins, Robert G. The Economic Effects of Multinational Corporations,
Vol. 1. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1977. 475 pp., $18.50.
Maged, Mark. Legal Aspects of Doing Business with Egypt, Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States (see Foreign Law, Middle East above).
Nicholls, Willis J. English Law for Business Studies (see Foreign Law,
Great Britain above).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

103

Russell, Brian. Introduction to Business Law in the Middle East. London:
Oyez Publishing Co., 1975. 118 pp., $10.25.
Sciberras, Edmond. Multinational Electronic Companies and Natural
Economic Policies. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1977. 285 pp.,
$21.50.
Tindall, Robert E. MultinationalEnterprises;Legal and Management Structures and Interrelationships with Ownership, Control, Antitrust,
Labor, Taxation, and Disclosure. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1975. 371 pp.
Unterman, Lee D.,.and Swent, Christine W. Future of the United States
Multinational Corporation. Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Institute of Government, 1975. 161 pp.
Wallace, Don. Regulation of Multinational Corporations. New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975. 200 pp., $16.50.
InternationalAntitrust
Barounos, Dimitri, Hall, D.F., and James, J. Rayner. EEC Antitrust Law
(see Foreign Law, EEC above).
Korah, Valentine. Competition Law of Britain and the Common Market.
New York: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1975. 311 pp., £8.
Legal and Government Affairs Symposium, 8th, Washington, D.C.,
1975. Growing with Antitrust; PracticalAdvice on Adapting Successfully to Antitrust Limitations on Franchisingand Licensed Distribution.
Washington: International Franchise Association, 1975. 116 pp.
Mueller, Rudolf, and Schneider, Hannes. The German Law Against
Restraints of Competition (see Foreign Law, West Germany above).
Tindall, Robert E. Multinational Enterprises;Legal and Management Structures and Interrelationships with Ownership, Control, Antitrust,
Labor, Taxation, and Disclosure(see General Corporate Law above).
Walsh, A.E., and Paxton, John. Competition Policy; EuropeanandInternational Trends and Practices. New York: MacMillan Publishing
Co., 1975. 196 pp., $19.95.
InternationalFinance
Calleo, David D., Ed. Money and the Coming World Order. New York:
NYO Press, 1976. 120 pp., $7.95 cloth, $3.95 paperback.
Gasteyger, Curt, Camu, Louis, and Behrman, Jack N. Energy, Inflation,
and International Economic Relations. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975. 239 pp., $16.50.
Gheerbrant, P.A. Cases in Banking Law (see Foreign Law, Great Britain
above).
Oliver, Robert W. InternationalEconomic Co-operationand the World Bank
(see Foreign Trade and Customs Law above).
Shonfield, Andrew, and Strange, Susan. International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971 (see Foreign Trade and
Customs Law above).

104

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Yeager, Leland B. International Monetary Relations; Theory, History and
Policy, 2d Ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 667 pp.
International Tax Law
Diamond, Walter H., and Diamond, Dorothy B. International Tax
Treaties of All Nations. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc.,
1975-76. Ten volumes, loose-leaf index, $50/volume, $25/index.
Gans, Ernest. PracticalGuide to Consolidated Returns and Multi-Corporate
Organizations. New York: Panel Publishers, Inc., 1975. One volume, loose-leaf, $49.95.
Hoorn, Jacobus van, Spitzer, Alexander, and Kolling, Grant W. Value
Added Taxation in Europe. Amsterdam: International Bureau for
Fiscal Documentation, 1975. Two volumes, loose-leaf.
Lewis, Mervyn. British Tax Law (see Foreign Law, Great Britain above).
Rhoades, Rufus von Thulen. Income Taxation of Foreign Related Transactions. New York: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1976. Two volumes, loose-leaf, $120.
Tindall, Robert E. Multinational Enterprises;Legal and Management Structures and Interrelationships with Ownership, Control, Antitrust,
Labor, Taxation, and Disclosure (see General Corporate Law above).
Investment Regulation
Brdicher, Horst, and Pulch, Dieter. The German Law of Foreign Investment
Shares (see Foreign Law, West Germany above).
Cameron, Virginia S. PrivateInvestments and InternationalTransactions in
Asian and South Pacific Countries. New York: Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc., 1975. 741 pp.
Gordon, Michael W. The Cuban Nationalizations: The Demise of Foreign
Private Property. Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1976. 244
pp., $27.50.
Robrin, Stephen J. Foreign Direct Investment, Industrialization and Social
Change. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, February, 1977. 325 pp.,
$22.50.
Lal, Deepak. Appraising Foreign Investment in Developing Countries.
London: William Heineman, Ltd., 1975. 291 pp., £6.
Olmstead, Cecil J., Hill, Howard B., Lillich, Richard B., Hauser, Rita
E., and Valdes S., Gabriel. International Law and Economic Intervention: Policing a Two-Way Street. Dobbs Ferry: Trans-Media/
Marketing Corp., 1976. Two cassettes, $40.
Siebel, Ulf R. German Restrictions on Capital Transactions with Foreigners
(see Foreign Law, West Germany above).
Tindall, Robert E. Multinational Enterprises;Legal and Management Structures and Interrelationships with Ownership, Control, Antitrust,
Labor, Taxation, and Disclosure (see General Corporate Law above).
Volhard, Ruidiger, and Weber, Dolf. Real Property in Germany (see
Foreign Law, West Germany above).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

105

Law of the Sea
Bouchez, L.J., and Kaijen, L. The Future of the Law of the Sea. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. 164 pp., $10.58.
Dupuy, Rene-Jean. The Law of the Sea, Current Problems. Dobbs Ferry:
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1974. 217 pp., $17.
Durante, F., and Rodino, W. Western Europe and the Development of the
Law of the Sea. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., Yet to be
published.
Knight, H. Gary. The Law of the Sea. Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc., 1976. 950 pp., loose-leaf, updated annually, $30.
Sebek, Victor. Eastern Europe and the Development of the Law of the Sea.
Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc. Yet to be published.
Simmonds, K.R., Ed. Cases on Law of the Sea. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1976. Eight to ten volumes, $40/volume.
Szekely, Alberto. Latin America and the Development of the Law of the Sea.
Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1976. Two volumes,
$60/volume.
Maritime Law
Garbesi, George C. ConsularAuthority over Seamen from the United States
Point of View. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968 (republication).
227 pp., $9.
Meyers, Herman. The Nationality of Ships. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1967 (republication). 395 pp., $10.58.
Ridley, Jasper, and Whitehead, G. Law of the Carriageof Goods by Land,
Sea and Air, 4th Ed. (see Foreign Law, Great Britain above).
Sassoon, David M. C.I.F. and F.O.B. Contracts, 2d Ed. London: Stevens
& Sons, Ltd., 1975. 472 pp., £15.50.

